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In certain product categories, large discount retailers are known to offer shallower assortments than 
traditional retailers. In this paper, we investigate the competitive incentives for such assortment decisions 
and the implications for manufacturers’ distribution strategies. Our results show that if one retailer has the 
channel power to determine its assortment first, then it can strategically reduce its assortment by carrying 
only the popular variety while simultaneously inducing the rival retailer to carry both the specialty and 
popular varieties. The rival retailer then bears higher assortment costs, which leads to relaxed price 
competition for the commonly carried popular variety. We also show that when the manufacturer has 
relative channel power, it chooses alternatively to distribute both product varieties through both retailers. 
Our analysis suggests, therefore, that when a retailer becomes dominant in the distribution channel, it 
facilitates retail segmentation into discount shops, carrying limited product lines, and specialty shops 
carrying wider assortments. We also illustrate how retailer power leading to strategic assortment 
reduction can lead to lower consumer surplus. 




Retailers and manufacturers today are increasingly subject to the decisions of a small circle of 
retailers that include mass merchandisers and wholesale clubs (Raju and Zhang 2005). These 
mass retailers and warehouse clubs are known to abandon certain specialty varieties and devote 
more shelf space to the more popular, high volume, brands.
1 By carrying fewer SKU’s, they can 
cut their retailing costs by making it easier to track inventories (Drèze, Hoch, and Purk 1994).
2 
An obvious consequence of reducing assortments is to improve the bottom line as well as to offer 
more competitive prices. But when a dominant, discount retailer decides not to carry a 
manufacturer’s specialty products, it may have an effect on the distribution decisions by other 
channel members. If the dominant retailer is strategic, it evaluates the decisions of other channel 
members when making its assortment plans. This paper evaluates this aspect of the assortment 
decision. 
Traditionally, it was the manufacturer who defined the breadth of its product line and 
distributed all varieties through complying retailers. The manufacturer’s decision criterion of 
whether to distribute a variety was whether there was sufficient demand to cover production and 
distribution costs. However, these notions of channel management must be reexamined in light 
of the well-documented shift in channel power toward major retailers (Kadiyali, Chintagunta and 
Vilcassim 2000). Indeed, these large retailers dictate to their vendors what should be made, in 
what colors, in what sizes and what they are made of (Bianco et al 2003, Munson and Rosenblatt 
1999). Our objective is to identify the consequence of this shift on manufacturer’s distribution 
decisions.  
We define a retailer as being dominant in the sense that it has the ability to credibly 
commit not to carry one or more of a manufacturer’s varieties. Our results indicate that this 
modest gain in channel power is sufficient to upset the distribution outcome relative to the case 
when the manufacturer has full distributional control. For example, large discount retailers may 
have the reputation for carrying shallow assortments in order to dedicate valuable shelf space to 
                                                 
1  For example, Wal-Mart has only a limited selection in various product categories that include groceries (O’Keefe 
2002) and baby goods (Desjardins 2005). Another successful mass merchant Target also has a limited assortment in 
different categories that range from consumer electronics (Master 2001) to automobile supplies (Discount Store 
News 1999). 
2  According to a recent Fortune article, the strategy of Costco is to provide a limited selection of high quality 
products. By stocking fewer items it streamlines distribution and hastens inventory turns (Helyar and Harrington, 
2003). 2 
popular products. If this is communicated throughout the industry, manufacturers and competing 
retailers will react accordingly. Alternatively, a dominant retailer, as mentioned above, may 
dictate what products the manufacturers should make. In these cases, we show that the shift in 
channel power toward a dominant retailer may have profound implications on the way a 
manufacturer’s products are distributed, the profitability of a channel and its members, the 
degree of competition between retailers, and on consumer welfare. 
In this paper, we use an analytical model of a manufacturer and two competing retailers 
to ask how distribution outcomes change when slightly shifting some authority in one of the 
channels. We find that a dominant retailer may have a profit incentive to refuse to distribute 
specialty varieties that extends beyond its own operational costs. In particular, if this retailer is 
strategic, it anticipates that competing retailers may choose to continue carrying a full line of 
products and, consequently, maintain high assortment costs. This passes on additional benefits to 
the dominant retailer in the form of relaxed price competition for the popular products. We show 
that such asymmetric distribution outcomes can arise by a modest shift in channel distribution 
authority to one of the retailers. We refer to this outcome as strategic assortment reduction and 
use our model to determine the conditions under which this arises. 
  Strategic assortment reduction occurs when a manufacturer prefers to distribute its full 
product line through a retailer but, when dominant, this retailer would rather choose to carry only 
the popular variety. As such, it reflects channel conflict, or diverging incentives between a 
manufacturer and an independent retailer regarding the assortment decision. These diverging 
incentives arise when the manufacturer is unable to set channel specific wholesale prices. 
Benefits that accrue to the channel through lower assortment costs in one channel are not fully 
captured by the manufacturer because its uniform wholesale price must reflect demand across the 
entire set of retailers.  
  It is interesting to point out that otherwise symmetric retailers may, in fact, carry different 
assortments. When one retailer wants to abandon a specialty variety, this lowers competition for 
it, thereby adding an incentive for another retailer to continue carrying it despite the additional 
assortment costs. A sample of retail stores in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area illustrates this 
asymmetry in assortment outcomes. Table 1 shows the breadth of assortment at large discounters 
Wal-Mart and Target in comparison to specialty stores. For these 7 product categories, these two 
discounters carry narrower assortments. Our research indicates that a shift in channel authority 3 
may play a role in this observation and suggests a contributing factor to the on going 
segmentation in the retail industry. 
This is in line with a folk wisdom in retailing that tells other, non-dominant retailers, who 
compete against low-cost discounters and the likes of Wal-Mart to find a niche rather than to try 
to duplicate its low pricing strategy. Rigby and Haas (2004), for example, suggest that there is a 
substantial segment of consumers who are willing to pay non-discount prices in return for a 
wider assortment.
3 
  The growth of the discount retail format has raised concern about the availability of 
specialty products and the impact on consumer welfare. Given the size and dominance of these 
discounters, some critics argue that their narrow assortments make specialty varieties harder to 
find (e.g., Bianco et al. 2003). Our research formally investigates these issues and provides some 
support as well as some refute of the critics’ concerns. 
 
   Number of SKU's  
Product Wal-MartTarget Specialty  Store 
Tazo Tea  5  5  9 (Giant Eagle Grocery)
T-Fal Skillets  10  8  15 (Linens and Things) 
Callaway Golf balls  4  4  5 (Dick's Sporting Goods) 
KitchenAid Stand Mixer  1  3  7 (Linens and Things) 
Graco Infant Car Seats  1  2  8 (Babies R' Us) 
Coleman Tents  1  2  6 (Dick's Sporting Goods) 
Graco Play Yards  2  2  7 (Babies R' Us) 
Table 1: Sample of Assortment Breadths at Selected Discounters and Specialty Stores 
  
Our model also permits us to measure the consequence of strategic assortment reduction 
on consumer welfare. We show that when channel authority is shifted from the manufacturer to a 
dominant retailer it leads to unambiguously lower levels of consumer surplus. The intuition is 
that a retailer does not account for double marginalization losses in competing retail channels 
and is, therefore, quicker to abandon a specialty variety before the manufacturer would. And, 
because retailers carrying a specialty variety have less downstream competition, double-
                                                 
3 According to Fortune, this is how “Central Market”, a new gourmet superstore recently opened by San Antonio-
based H.E. Butt Grocery Co. whose H.E.B chain is the second largest private supermarket business in the country, 
competes with Wal-Mart. Central Market has a huge selection: some 30 types of apples, twenty kinds of homemade 
sausage, 2300 labels of wine and 400 types of beer (O’Keefe. 2002).  4 
marginalization inefficiencies are enhanced. Thus, consumers, on the whole, suffer as a result of 
strategic assortment reduction. This result, therefore, legitimizes some of the critics’ concerns 
about the detriment of retail dominance on consumer well-being. 
At a general level, our work falls in line with the growing body of research investigating 
the implications of shifting channel power in the retail sector. Dukes, Gal-Or, and Srinivasan 
(2006), Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003), and Raju and Zhang (2005), for example, examine the 
implications of changing channel power on the distribution of channel profits. The current work, 
in contrast, examines the implication of this shift of channel power on distribution and product 
line decisions. This is similar in spirit to Geylani, Dukes and Srinivasan (2006), which 
investigates the implication of this shift on manufacturer’s joint promotions and advertising 
decisions. 
More specifically, this paper contributes to the literature on retailing, variety, and 
assortment. There is a substantial literature in marketing that examines the trade-offs associated 
with the assortment decision. The early work of Baumol and Ide (1956) identifies that the benefit 
of wide assortments in attracting customers must be balanced with the additional stocking and 
inventory costs, and Nilsson and Høst (1987) offer operational tools to navigate these costs and 
benefits. This trade-off is present in our paper. However, we take a closer look at the impact of a 
store’s assortment on decisions upstream and across to competing stores.  
More recently, Messinger and Narasimhan (1997) empirically verify a trend in 
consumers’ assessment of the assortment trade-off. Specifically, they show that growing 
opportunity costs of shopping (e.g. higher wages) have increased the value of assortment to 
grocery stores. Hoch, Bradlow and Wansink (1999) identify why and by how much a consumer 
cares about assortment at a given store. Briesch, Chitagunta and Fox (2005) examine the impact 
of assortment on consumers’ grocery store choice. Alternatively, Boatwright and Nunes (2001), 
Borle et al. (2005), and Broniarczyk, Hoyer and McAlister (1998) evaluate the impact of 
assortment reduction of a retailer on sales, customer retention, and consumers’ perception of the 
variety, respectively, at a given store. These works offer a deep examination of assortment on 
consumers’ store choices and perceptions. In contrast, we abstract from the consumer decision in 
order to evaluate the impact of a retailer’s assortment decision on channel management and 
distribution.   5 
Another stream of research has assessed the impact of the evolving retail sector on 
upstream decisions and the variety of consumer products. For example, Marvel and Peck (2004), 
motivated by the apparent reduction in shirt and shoe size offerings, point out that retailers may 
have an incentive to carry limited varieties in order to segment and differentiate the market. 
Similarly, our paper points to strategic incentives to reduce assortment. In contrast, the strategic 
incentive of assortment reduction in our paper is to pass on costs to the competing retailer in 
order to gain a strategic advantage.  
Allain and Waelbroeck (2006) and Inderst and Shaffer (2006) evaluate the impact of 
retail concentration on the upstream incentive to offer product variety. Allain and Waelbroeck 
(2006) argue that retail concentration may explain the documented reduction in new CD releases 
by limiting manufacturers ability to segment the market (e.g. with new and old releases). Inderst 
and Shaffer (2006) identify how a merger of non-competing retailers can commit to fewer 
products varieties in order to leverage market power over consumers and thereby increase its 
upstream buyer power.  This encourages manufacturers’ to narrow their product lines. Overall 
economic welfare, therefore, declines, as a result of the retail merger. Neither of these papers, 
however, focuses on the strategic incentive of one retailer over another with respect to its 
assortment decision as is done in our paper. 
Finally, this paper contributes to research on retail segmentation. Bhatnagar and 
Ratchford (2004) identify consumer heterogeneity with respect to breadth of assortment as a 
significant factor in determining consumer choice across retail formats. Our paper contributes to 
this reasoning by further suggesting that retail dominance also plays a natural role in segmenting 
discount stores from specialty stores. Zhu, Singh, & Dukes (2006), point out that the location of 
an entering discount retailer plays a role in altering consumer shopping patterns inducing 
traditional incumbent retailer to segment across income levels. Again, the current paper 
illustrates how resultant segmentation may arise simply from incentives within the channel. 
  The general model is presented and analyzed in the next section. This section also 
characterizes the equilibrium outcomes in both variants of the model: the manufacturer-dominant 
model and the retailer-dominant model. Section 3 evaluates the consequences of strategic 
assortment reduction on consumer welfare. Section 4 summarizes and concludes with managerial 
implications. An appendix contains the omitted details of the analysis and all proofs. 6 
2. A Model of Assortment Choice 
The objective of our analysis is to illustrate the consequence of retailer dominance on assortment 
outcomes. As such, our analytics can be seen as a controlled exercise to isolate the impact of 
changing the assortment decision maker. We consider a game-theoretic model consisting of three 
players: two retailers, A and B, and a manufacturer, M. The manufacturer has two products in its 
product line, call product 1 and 2, and distributes these products to two competing retailers. In 
stage 1, M decides its distribution plan and then sets wholesale (supply) prices for the products it 
sells. In stage 2, retailers A and B choose quantities, which are subsequently stocked and sold. 
We consider two variants of this model. Each variant depicts one of the two channel dominant 
settings investigated. In the M-Dominant game, M fully determines the assortments for both the 
retailers in stage 1. This is contrasted with the A-Dominant game, which has an additional 
starting stage, referred to as Stage 0, in which retailer A announces which products it will (or 
won’t) carry in its assortment. Subsequently, in stage 1, M decides what to distribute through 
retailer B. We employ this notion of dominance to illustrate the profound impact of a slight shift 
in channel distribution authority to one of the retailers. As we show, this additional channel 
power is sufficient to alter the equilibrium distribution, which may lower consumer welfare and, 
in some cases, be Pareto inferior for the channel. 
The trade off in the assortment decision concerns assortment costs, which are defined by 
expenses associated with monitoring and handling additional SKU’s. These are incurred by the 
retailer and depend on number of products carried. Specifically, we suppose that each retailer 
faces the same marginal cost function,  ) (n c , where n is the number of products it carries and 
0 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ≥ > c c . This specification reflects diseconomies of scale in the breadth of product 
assortment. Specifically, by carrying a lower number of SKU’s, retailers have lower inventory 
and handling costs. While these costs are borne directly by the retailer, they have implications 
for the manufacturer’s distribution strategy. This is due to the fact that assortment costs affect 
channel margins. 
The products can be thought of as two varieties in the manufacturer’s product line. One 
variety is more popular than the other. For example, a compact disc (CD) manufacturer makes 
and distributes many varieties of music. There is a new CD from a popular band and then there is 
one from a lesser known band. Product 1 denotes the “popular” variety and product 2 the 
“specialty” variety. We impose the assumption that these products do not compete for each other. 7 
This simplifies the analysis and clarifies the strategic incentive in assortment reduction. We 
analyze the last two stages of the model as follows. 
During stage 1, the manufacturer sets a wholesale price  i w , for each product i, provided it 
is to be sold. Retailers subsequently choose quantities in stage 2. Let 
j
i q , be the amount of 
product i bought by retailer  B A j , = . Retailers then sell this quantity to the market. The retail 
price of each product is determined by the total quantity in the market:
4 
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where  0 > a  and  2 1 b b < . This specification captures our assumption that product 2 is a 
“specialty” variety. A larger coefficient b indicates that the price needed to clear the shelves of 
this product declines more quickly with respect to quantity.
 Note that we assume the price of 
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carry product i then  0 =
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Total profits for retailer j are the product profits in (3) summed over products: 
j Π =
j
i i Π Σ = 2 , 1 . Given the quantities expressed in (2), M chooses wholesale prices in stage 1 to 
                                                 
4 In this sense, we model competition between the two retailers as “Cournot,” which lets us focus on the assortment 
decisions of channel members rather than defining details about consumer choice. This yields an identical outcome 
as a two-stage “Bertrand” game if one considers each retailer’s quantity decision (capacity) chosen first and 
followed by price setting (Kreps & Scheinkman, 1983). 
5 This is made for simplicity. As we discuss in section 4, the presence of competition between varieties tends to 
reinforce the basic motive for strategic assortment reduction.  8 
maximize profits. Because of the competitive independence of products 1 and 2, profit 







i q q w + = Π ,          ( 4 )  
subject to (2) over  0 ≥ i w  for i = 1,2. Total profits for the manufacturer are the product profits in 
(4) summed over products: 
M Π = 1,2
M
ii = Π Σ . Using M’s first order conditions for this 
maximization and the retailers’ optimal reactions in (2), a straightforward derivation leads to a 
general characterization, which, for brevity, is relegated to Lemma A.1 in the Appendix. This 
characterization allows us to simplify the analysis by considering four relevant distribution 
outcomes. These four outcomes are depicted in Figure 1.  
The first outcome has the manufacturer distributing only the popular product, product 1. 
We call this outcome, single product with dual distribution (S). Note that since the market for 
product 2 is smaller, distributing only product 2 through both retailers is always dominated by 
distributing only product 1. Forthwith, we ignore the single distribution of product 2. A second 
outcome, which we call full product line with dual distribution (F) involves selling the entire 
product line through both retailers. As an asymmetric case, it is possible to have product 1 
distributed through retailer A and both products through retailer B. This we term as full product 
line with specialty distribution (Sp). Finally, it is possible for full product line with exclusive 
distribution (Ex) in which each retailer is given exclusive sale of one of the two products. 
Obviously, the distributional arrangements depicted above do not represent all possible. 
We omit all strategically dominated arrangements such as distribution S with product 2, as 
already mentioned above. Similarly, distributing both products exclusively through one retailer is 
dominated by Ex whenever assortment costs are strictly positive. Finally, note that distributions 
Sp and Ex each have mirror counterparts with respect to retailers A and B. However, we have 
assumed that retailers are symmetric, which implies that the outcomes depicted in Figure 1 
(weakly) dominate them for M. This is not the case, however, when retailers have asymmetric 
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Figure 1: Distribution Outcomes 
 
Without loss of generality, normalize retail cost by defining  0 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( = > ≡ c c c . This 
normalization offers the interpretation that c represents the increase in unit cost of carrying an 
additional product. This incorporates the notion that handling an additional product increases the 
marginal cost for all products because of the added sorting and tracking of multiple products in 
the store. Under this assumption, the relevant payoffs and quantities can be compactly expressed, 
which we do in the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 1  
Let  a c <  and  2 1 b b < . Payoffs in the four distribution outcomes given in Figure 1 are 
expressed as in Table 2. 
 10 
Proposition 1 allows us to reduce the analysis of both the M and A Dominant games to a 
series of comparisons in payoffs. Our particular interest is in understanding the impact of retail 
dominance on the distribution outcome. To do this we identify regions of the parameters space in 
1 , , b c a  and  2 b  such that, if held constant, the equilibrium distribution outcome changes when 
dominance changes – moving from the M-Dominant regime to the A-Dominant regime. 
 
Outcome:  S F  Sp  Ex 
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Table 2: Payoffs and Quantities in the Distribution Outcomes of Figure 1 
2.1 The M-Dominant Game 
In the M-Dominant version of the game, M announces which products it expects the two retailers 
to carry. In contrast, the A-Dominant version of the game has retailer A declaring which of the 
manufacturer’s products it will and will not handle. The manufacturer then decides how to 
distribute its products under the constraint imposed by A’s declaration. 
  We first consider the M-Dominant regime and examine what distributional arrangements 
are optimal for M, given the parameters  1 , , b c a  and  2 b . This is done by a straightforward 
comparison of M’s profits in the first row of Table 2 over the parameter space. The orderings of 
these profits depend on the two ratios    [0,1] / ∈ a c  and    [0,1] / 2 1 ∈ b b . The first ratio represents 
the size of the assortment cost relative to the market size for the product category. The second 
ratio measures the distribution of the market across the two varieties. In particular, the larger the 
ratio, the more equally the market is distributed over the two varieties.   
Figure 2 depicts M’s optimal outcome, and therefore the equilibrium of the M-Dominant 
game for any given parameter constellation  ) / , / ( 2 1 a c b b . The curve denoted by f is defined by 
M’s indifference across distribution outcomes S and Sp. Similarly, the curves labeled g and h are 11 
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Outcomes in M-Dominant Game 
 
When  1
123 / bb < , Ex is never optimal for M. Because product 1 is significantly more 
popular than product 2, it is always optimal for M to distribute product 1 through both retailers. 
For relatively high assortment costs, M chooses to only distribute the popular product through 
both retailers (outcome S). As assortment costs decrease somewhat, it becomes optimal for M to 
introduce the specialty variety through one of the retailers (outcome Sp). And finally, when 
assortment costs decrease sufficiently, full distribution through both retailers is optimal for the 
manufacturer (outcome F). 
On the other hand, when  12 /1 / 3 bb > , S is never optimal for M. In this region the 
manufacturer views the two products similarly and outcomes Ex and F dominate the parameter 
space. That is, when products are more similar in market size, M’s trade-off is simply the benefit 
of additional revenue from broader market coverage versus the channel losses from assortment 
costs. Therefore, it is optimal for M to establish exclusive territories for each product (outcome 
                                                 
6 The technical arguments leading to Figure 2 are provided in Proposition A.1, found in the Appendix. 12 
Ex) when assortment costs are larger than 
3
2 () 1 g ζ = − , but otherwise open the market for both 
products (outcome F) for low assortment costs. 
The preceding analysis of the M-Dominant game sets the benchmark for comparing M’s 
optimal distribution strategy with that desired by a dominant retailer. Note that the model 
generates all possible equilibrium outcomes, and therefore, offers a parsimonious 
characterization of M’s distribution incentives with respect to assortment costs and demand 
conditions.  
2.2 The A-Dominant Game: Strategic Assortment Reduction 
We now turn to an analysis of the A-Dominant game. In this game, retailer A has the channel 
power with regard only to its assortment. What to distribute through retailer B remains in M’s 
control. Obviously, if it is optimal for M to distribute only one product – always product 1 – 
through retailer A, then A will never refuse to carry it and, as a result, A’s channel power would 
be of no consequence. Therefore, the relevant region for the analysis of the A-Dominant game is 
the region in which it is optimal for M to choose F in the M-Dominant game. To make matters 
precise we define the following notation. Let  } , , { S Ex Sp = Λ  be the set of possible outcomes in 
which retailer A does not carry product 2 and 




F Π > Π  for all  Λ ∈ x . Specifically, 
2
12 12 {( / , / ) [0,1] | / min{ ( / ), ( )} bbca ca g bb g ζ Θ= ∈ < }, 
which corresponds to the lower region of the graph in Figure 2.  
  Refusing to carry product 2 is optimal for A only if she prefers another outcome  Λ ∈ x  
over F. This is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for strategic assortment reduction. In 
particular, if retailer A is fully strategic, then it evaluates the consequence of refusing to carry 
product 2 on M’s distribution strategy in its other retail channel. Suppose that A rejects product 2 
in period 0. Then M has three options with respect to retailer B: distribute both varieties, product 
1 only, or product 2 only. This corresponds to the outcomes in Λ. We can now state the exact 
conditions for a strategic assortment reduction in equilibrium as follows: x is a strategic 









x Π > Π  for all  Λ ∈ ≠ y x y ;.  13 
Condition (i) says that retailer A has, in fact, an incentive to change the outcome from F, while 
condition (ii) requires that M’s subsequent distribution strategy is optimal given A does not carry 
product 2.  
  From (ii), we can immediately rule out S as a possible equilibrium outcome in this game. 
Recall that M prefers the outcome Sp to S in regions below the curve f in Figure 2. And since Θ  
lies entirely below the curve f, assortment costs are always sufficiently low so that M prefers to 
distribute both varieties through B over distributing only product 1. 
 With  S ruled out as an optimal choice for M, we can use the previous results to determine 
her optimal choice among Ex and Sp for parameters in in Θ . In particular, because the curve 
defined by h determines M’s indifference between these two outcomes, we conclude that M 
prefers Ex for regions of Θ  above h and Sp for regions below h.  
  We turn to condition (i) to determine retailer A’s optimal decision whether to carry 
product 2 given M’s reaction described above. First observe that a comparison of profit 










b b k a c ,   where 
2
1 1 b
b + ≡ γ   .     (5) 
The indifference curve defined by k lies everywhere below g which implies that F is the 
equilibrium outcome of the A-Dominant game for all  ) / , / ( 2 1 a c b b  with  ) / ( / 2 1 b b k a c < . This 
can be seen in Figure 3.
7 That A’s indifference curve lies everywhere below M’s (i.e. that  k lies 
everywhere below g)  reflects the central aspect of channel conflict behind strategic assortment 
reduction: A is willing to reject the specialty variety at lower costs than M would prefer.  
In the regions of Θ  above k and below the curves g and h, retailer A prefers Sp over F 
and the manufacturer earns the highest profit with Sp given that she cannot implement F. Thus, 
Sp must be the equilibrium outcome in this region.  
 Finally,  we  examine  A’s preferences in the remaining sector of Θ  above the curve h, 
which is the region M establishes exclusive territories (Ex) in reaction to A not carrying product 2 
(see Section 2.1).  It is readily checked by comparing profits 
A
Ex Π  and 
A
F Π  that A prefers Ex over 
F, which implies that condition (i) holds in this region for Ex. This argument establishes the 
                                                 
7 The technical arguments leading to Figure 3 are provided in Proposition A.2, found in the Appendix. 14 
equilibrium outcomes of the A-Dominant game, which are depicted in Figure 3, and gives the 
following result. 
 PROPOSITION 2 Let  12 (/,/) bbca b e  i n  Θ . 
(i)  For significant assortment costs,  12 /( / ) ca k bb > , strategic assortment reduction is an 
equilibrium outcome. Specifically, either Sp or Ex is the (unique) equilibrium 
outcome of the A-Dominant game while F is the equilibrium outcome of the M-
Dominant game.  
(ii)  Otherwise, when  12 /( / ) ca k bb <  F is the equilibrium outcome of both the A-
Dominant and M-Dominant games. 
 
Proposition 2 establishes that A’s dominance in determining assortment may, in fact, alter 
the distribution of M’s products. Specifically, when Ex or Sp is the equilibrium of the A-
Dominant game, M would have chosen F in the M-Dominant game. As indicated in the second 
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Outcomes in A-Dominant Game 
 15 
A deeper interpretation for this key result is aided by Figure 3. The regions above curve k 
indicate when strategic assortment reduction is an equilibrium outcome. The intuition behind M 
and A’s diverging preferences can be seen by understanding when the channel member switches 
from F to Sp as assortment costs increase. As indicated in Figure 3, A’s indifference curve k lies 
everywhere below M’s indifference curve g. For any fixed market size distribution,  2 1 /b b , 
retailer A prefers Sp over F for lower assortment costs  a c/ than does M. The reason is that A 
accrues benefits from higher assortment costs in the Sp outcome (from Proposition 1, 
0 / > ∂ Π ∂ c
A
Sp ). When A’s rival B has higher costs, its retail price for product 1 is higher, and A 
benefits from the relaxed price competition, as a result. 
The manufacturer, M, on the other hand, does not fully benefit from this relaxed retail 
price competition because it is unable to price discriminate, by assumption.  Thus it cannot 
unilaterally raise its wholesale price to capture the additional channel surpluses with A. In fact, M 
is forced to reduce its uniform wholesale price (in Sp, ) ( 2 2
1
1
c a w − = ) as assortment costs 
increase, which is another benefit for A in the Sp outcome. These benefits imply that A will 
abandon product 2 before it is optimal for M to do so. Therefore, Sp is a strategic assortment 
reduction equilibrium in the region indicated by Proposition 2. 
There is a broader marketing implication from this result, which can be seen in the 
context of the retail segmentation. In the strategic assortment reduction outcome Sp, the 
dominant retailer, A, lowers its costs while inducing higher costs on its rival. In addition, A 
carries higher volumes than B: 0 / 1 1 1 > = − b c q q
B A . Our analysis suggests, therefore, that when a 
retailer becomes dominant in the distribution channel, it may facilitate retail segmentation into 
discount shops, carrying large volumes of limited product lines, and specialty shops, which carry 
wider assortments and “harder-to-find” varieties. 
Finally, note that according Proposition 2, exclusive distribution of products 1 and 2 (Ex) 
can also be a strategic assortment reduction outcome in equilibrium. This can be seen from the 
fact that in regions above the indifference curve h, M prefers Ex over Sp. As product 2 becomes 
relatively more popular (higher  2 1 /b b ), M favors exclusive distribution and does not incur the 
channel losses associated with higher assortment costs. Unlike in the Sp outcome discussed 
above, Ex affords the manufacturer individualized wholesale pricing. Thus, the added channel 
surplus that comes with low retail costs can be absorbed with wholesale price,  2 w . 16 
In contrast, A would prefer that M distribute product 1, in addition to product 2, through 
retailer B and increase his assortment costs. Specifically, when retailer A refuses to distribute 
product 2, she would actually prefer that M implement Sp rather than Ex. Consequently, in the A-
Dominant game, retailer A forces an outcome that is second-best for itself. Nevertheless, A’s 
refusal to carry product 2 is strategically optimal since F is a worse outcome than Ex.  
2.3 Asymmetric Assortment Costs 
We previously assumed that the only distinction between the two retailers was that A acquired 
the ability to move first and announced its refusal to carry one of the manufacturer’s products. It 
is natural to suppose that this ability may come with other advantages, such as being more 
efficient. Suppose, for instance, that retailer A has lower assortment costs than retailer B. From 
the overall channel perspective, in this case, there are obviously advantages to using A to 
distribute both varieties. Recall the specialty distribution (Sp) from Figure 1. If this is optimal for 
M, then clearly M would choose A over B for distributing the entire product line. This 
corresponds to SpA in Figure 4. The question we ask here is: would A abandon to carry the 
specialty variety even though it is more efficient in assortment than its rival B? As we show, the 
answer is yes.  
Formally, let 0 (1) (2)
jj j cc c = <≡  for  , jA B =  with 
A B cc < , which reflects the 
efficiency advantage of retailer A over B. We evaluate the consequence of a shift in channel 
power from the manufacturer to retailer A by considering the M-Dominant and A-Dominant 
games in a similar vein as before. In order to draw on the previous analysis, define  2
A B cc c + =  to be 
the average assortment cost and consider points 
2
12 ( / , / ) [0,1] bbca ∈  which lead to Sp in the M-
Dominant game of section 2.1. Specifically, restrict attention to the region defined by 
2
12 12 12 12 { (/,/)[ 0 , 1 ] |(/) / m i n { (/) , (/) } } Sp bbca g bb ca f bb h bb Θ= ∈ < < , 
which is the region denoted by Sp in Figure 2. By construction, all parameter constellations 
residing in  Sp Θ  lead to some form of specialty distribution being optimal for the manufacturer. 
The fact that 
A B cc <  implies SpA is the optimal specialty distribution for M and is, thus, the 
equilibrium outcome in the M-Dominant game. In the case of asymmetric costs, strategic 
assortment reduction is said to occur whenever SpA is the equilibrium of the M-Dominant game, 
but SpB is the equilibrium of the A-Dominant game.  17 
 In  the  A-Dominant game, the question of whether A will abandon product 2 or not is 













SpB b a Π= + ,   (6) 
which can be derived applying Lemma A.1 in the appendix. Upon inspection of the profit 
expressions for A in (6), note that the relative assortment cost difference increases A’s benefit 
from SpB. That is, the marginal benefit to A from switching from SpA to SpB is increasing in the 
cost asymmetry  0
BA cc −> . Furthermore, this benefit is stronger for smaller ratios  12 / bb . In 
fact,  12 (/,/) Sp bbca ∈Θ  ensures that  !2 /0 . 6 4 bb ζ ≤ ≈ . This reasoning suggests that A will, in 
fact, always abandon the specialty product whenever M finds it optimal to use A for a specialty 
distribution. This is formally established in Proposition 3. 
 
PROPOSITION 3 Let 
A B cc < ,  12 (/, /)
j bbc a  b e  i n   Sp Θ  for j = A, B. Then SpA is the 
equilibrium outcome of the M-Dominant game and SpB is the equilibrium outcome of the A-
Dominant game. 
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Figure 4: Specialty Distributions 
 
This result implies that despite being more efficient in handling assortment, A prefers an 
inefficient rival to carry the burden of assortment. In addition, retailer A abandons the specialty 18 
variety in the A-Dominant game whenever and despite the fact that SpA is optimal for the 
manufacturer. This has direct implications for the channel. In particular, A’s dominance will 
always lower channel efficiencies. Moreover, because this leads to higher retailer costs, 
consumers pay higher prices and consume less in SpB than in SpA. Therefore, A’s dominance 
lowers consumer welfare. We investigate the consumer welfare issue in more detail in the next 
section. 
3.  Strategic Assortment Reduction and Consumer Welfare  
In this section we ask whether strategic assortment reduction, as a consequence of retail 
dominance in the channel, increases or decreases the welfare of consumers. Consumers benefit 
when more products are available through more channels, but suffer the portion of assortment 
costs passed through retail prices. In the asymmetric cost case of section 2.3, this trade-off was 
clear because strategic assortment reduction simply resulted in higher retailing costs without 
changing the number of distribution channels. However, as we saw in section 2.2, strategic 
assortment reduction reduces the number of distribution channels of product 2 while 
simultaneously lowering costs. Thus, understanding the consumer welfare trade-off in the 
symmetric case requires additional analysis, to which the remainder of this section is devoted. 
  To investigate the impact of strategic assortment reduction on consumer welfare, we 
determine the outcome that maximizes consumer surplus, which is computed as follows. For a 




i i q q x q + = ) ( , 2 , 1 = i  
where 
j
i q  are the individual quantities listed in Table 2 from Proposition 1 under the 
corresponding outcome. Then consumer surplus under outcome x is 
  [] []
2 ()
1,2 1,2 2 0 () ( () ) ()
i i qx b
xi i i i ii CS p q p q x dq q x == =− = ∑∑ ∫ ,    (7) 
which is the area between the demand curve (1) and the price. As the right-hand side expression 
in (7) indicates, consumer surplus depends crucially on the output  i q  of the two varieties. 
Obviously, the level of output of each product, in turn, depends on the number of retail outlets 
through which the products are distributed. This suggests that full distribution, F, has the most 
quantity, followed by the specialty distribution, Sp and finally exclusive territories, Ex. However, 
as retailers take on a second product, assortment costs raise retail costs and lower output. The 
following proposition confirms that the former effect dominates in the region Θ . 19 
 
PROPOSITION 4 For  ) / , / ( 2 1 a c b b  in Θ , consumer surplus is maximized with the outcome 
F and minimized with the outcome Ex. Specifically,  Ex Sp F CS CS CS > > . 
 
  The implication of this proposition is that any strategic assortment reduction induced by 
A’s dominance lowers consumer surplus. In fact, under the conditions leading to outcome Ex in 
equilibrium of the A-Dominant game, consumer surplus is minimized.  
  This result relates to the usual inefficiencies associated with monopoly power. 
Specifically, when retailer A decides to abandon product 2, she evaluates the added margin on all 
units of product 1 sold versus the opportunity costs of lost profit from the sale of product 2. What 
she does not internalize, however, is the additional social costs, in the form of monopoly 
inefficiencies, incurred by consumers of product 2. Consequently, when A implements Sp or Ex, 
it adversely affects consumers surplus relative to F. 
The adverse affect that comes with this strategic assortment reduction is partially counter-
veiled by the fact that A’s costs are lower in Sp leading to higher output (lower prices) for 
product 1 than in F. In fact, from Proposition 1, we note that total output of the popular variety 


















This implies directly that consumers of the popular variety, product 1, benefit from strategic 
assortment reduction. Proposition 4, however, tells us that this benefit is overshadowed by the 
loss in consumer surplus due to lower output in the specialty variety, product 2.  
When  2 1 /b b  becomes larger (crossing over indifference curve h in Figure 3), this adverse 
effect on consumer surplus is doubled. In this case, the manufacturer, when evaluating the 
distribution through retailer B, makes the same assessment as made by A above and abandons 
one of the products to lower assortment costs. And, because the profitability of each product is 
relatively similar when  2 1 /b b  is large, the channel, and in particular, the manufacturer, is better 
off distributing only product 2 to retailer B. 20 
4. Conclusion & Managerial Implications 
This paper has sought to identify whether a retailer has strategic incentives that deviate from a 
manufacturer’s with respect to assortment. We have illustrated that a retailer may be quicker to 
abandon a manufacturer’s specialty variety when there are increasing costs associated with the 
number of SKU’s. In a competitive retail setting, a first-moving retailer can remove a specialty 
variety from its assortment while anticipating that a rival retailer will want to carry it in spite of 
the additional costs. This fact has several implications for managers that are brought out in our 
analysis.  
First, the ability of one retailer to commit to its assortment decision before other channel 
members may have great impact on the distributional outcomes. In particular, by refusing to 
carry a manufacturer’s specialty variety, the dominant retailer can lower its own costs while 
simultaneously inducing the competing retailer to carry the manufacturer’s full product line. 
Thus, the competing retailer bears the higher assortment costs thereby giving the dominant 
retailer a cost advantage. For manufacturers, this indicates added channel coordination problems 
as a result of reduced competition for the specialty product. 
Second, a dominant retailer may have a profit incentive to refuse to distribute specialty 
varieties that extend beyond its own operational costs. Particularly, by not distributing the 
specialty product, the dominant retailer can pass on the assortment costs to the competing 
retailer.  Because of these higher costs, the rival retailer’s consumer price is higher. The 
dominant retailer benefits from the relaxed price competition for the commonly carried popular 
product, as a result. 
Third, under conditions supporting a strategic assortment reduction, consumer welfare is 
unambiguously reduced. Consumers of the popular product may get lower prices, but lower 
competition for the specialty product leads to monopoly inefficiencies as well as more severe 
losses to double-marginalization. Thus, the growth of the discount retail format is not always in 
the consumer’s best interest.  
Fourth, strategic assortment reduction outcomes reflect retail segmentation in the form of 
a discounter – the dominant, low-cost retailer – and a specialty shop – the high-cost, wide 
assortment retailer. Recognizing this segmentation may help manufacturers tailor other elements 
of the marketing mix as it applies to specific channels. For instance, manufacturers with wide 
product lines may want to focus training for sales staff at specialty shops in order to direct 21 
consumers to the product with best suited features.
8 Sales staff at the dominant retailer, on the 
other hand, need not receive such training. 
In our analysis, we made several simplifying assumptions in order to dig out the impact 
of retail dominance on assortment outcomes. For instance, we have not considered competitive 
effects between varieties. By introducing this dimension of competition, the dominant retailer 
would have an extra incentive to loose the specialty variety to insulate its popular variety from 
this additional competitive pressure. This reasoning implies that inter-variety competition tends 
to reinforce the motivation for strategic assortment reduction.   
The manufacturer may also have strategic variables other than wholesale prices at its 
disposal, which we have not modeled. Advertising and other promotional activity by the 
manufacturer are bound to be altered as a result of the shift in channel power and this may 
change the distributional incentives discussed in our model. In addition, relaxing the restriction 
that wholesale prices are uniform and allowing more complicated wholesale pricing contracts 
will clearly improve the ability to extract retailer surpluses and align assortment incentives 
within the channel.  
 
Appendix 
Lemma A.1 (Equilibrium of the Subgame Starting at Stage 1) 
(i) When product i is carried by both retailers, the manufacturer’s and retailers’ product-










































































for j j j ≠ − = ; 2 , 1 . 
 
                                                 
8 Gorman (2001) provides a recent illustration from the cookware category, in which manufacturers offer specialty 
retailers training that instructs floor personnel how to position and sell new products.  22 





























Proof of Lemma A.1 
Retailers’ optimal reactions to wholesale prices  i w , i = 1,2 are given in equation (2). For i = 1,2, 






i q q w + = Π , subject to the reactions in (2) over  0 ≥ i w . 
Substitute these values back in to (2) to obtain equilibrium quantities. Equilibrium profits for 
product i are computed by substituting the optimal  i w ’s and 
j
i q   into (3) and (4).  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The expressions given Table 1 follow from Lemma A.1 as follows. For outcome F, substitute 
c c c
B A = =  into the expressions in part (i) for products i = 1,2 and compute profits 
j
i i
j Π = Π ∑  for j = M, A, and B. For Sp, substitute  0 =
A c  and  c c
B = , with product 1 carried 
by both retailers using expressions of part (i) of Lemma A.1 and product 2 carried by retailer B 
only using expressions of part (ii) of the lemma. Profits are 
j
i i
j Π = Π ∑  for j = M and B and 
A A
1 Π = Π . For Ex, substitute  0 = =
B A c c , with product 1 carried by A and product 2 carried by 
B using the expressions in part (ii) of the above lemma. Profits are 
M M M
2 1 Π + Π = Π , 
A A
1 Π = Π , 
and 
B B
2 Π = Π . For S, substitute  0 = =
B A c c , with product 1 carried by A and B using 
expressions of part (ii) of the lemma. Profits are 
j j
1 Π = Π , for j = M, A and B. Q.E.D. 
 
PROPOSITION A.1  
Let 
2
2 1 [0,1] ) , , / ( ∈ b b a c and denote 
435
3 0.64 ζ
− ≡≈. Then there exist functions ) / ( 2 1 b b f , 
) / ( 2 1 b b g , and  ) / ( 2 1 b b h  with  1 ) / ( ) / ( 0 2 1 2 1 < < < b b f b b g  for all  ) 1 , 0 ( / 2 1 ∈ b b , 
12 12 12 (/) (/) (/) gb b hb b fb b << for all  ) , ( / 3
1
2 1 ζ ∈ b b  and  ) / ( ) / ( 2 1 2 1 b b g b b h <  for all 
12 /( , 1 ) bb ζ ∈  which characterize the equilibria of the M-Dominant game as follows. 
(i)  If  3
1
2 1 / 0 < < b b  then the unique equilibrium outcome is 23 
F  if and only if  ) / ( / 0 2 1 b b g a c < < ; 
Sp  if and only if  ) / ( / ) / ( 2 1 2 1 b b f a c b b g < < ; 
S  if and only if  1 / ) / ( 2 1 < < a c b b f . 
(ii)  If  ζ < < 2 1 3
1 /b b  then the unique equilibrium outcome is 
F  if and only if  ) / ( / 0 2 1 b b g a c < < ; 
Sp  if and only if  ) / ( / ) / ( 2 1 2 1 b b h a c b b g < < ; 
Ex  if and only if  1 / ) / ( 2 1 < < a c b b h . 
(iii) If  1 / 2 1 < < b b ζ  then the unique equilibrium outcome is  
F  if and only if  ) ( / 0 ζ g a c < < ; 
Ex if and only if  1 / ) ( < < a c g ζ . 
 
Proof of Proposition A.1 
In the M-Dominant game, the manufacturer implements its preferred distributional strategy based 
on outcome leading to the most profits. Comparing profit levels across these four outcomes 
requires pair-wise comparisons using the profit expressions in Proposition 1. Specifically, five 
(5) such comparisons are sufficient to determine the equilibrium in all regions of the parameter 
space 
2 [0,1] . Direct comparisons of profits leads to the following:  
M M
FE x > ΠΠ <   ⇔   /1 3 / 2 ca < − > .         ( A . 1 )  
M M
SE x > ΠΠ <   ⇔   12 /1 / 3 bb <
> .          ( A . 2 )  
M M
FS p > ΠΠ <   ⇔   1
12 2 /( 1 ) / ( ) ( / ) ca g bb δδ < −− ≡ > .    (A.3) 
where  ) 4 /( 1 2 1 b b + ≡ δ . The function g is strictly increasing in  2 1 /b b  on [0,1] and represents 
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−− >< ΠΠ⇔ ≡ <> −−
.    (A.5) 24 
Because  f ˆ  is strictly increasing and h ˆ is strictly decreasing in  a c/  on [0,1], we define for 
∈ 2 1 /b b [0,1], ) / ( ˆ ) / ( 2 1
1
2 1 b b f b b f
− ≡  and  ) / ( ˆ ) / ( 2 1
1
2 1 b b h b b h
− ≡ , which represent M’s 
indifference curve for outcomes S versus Sp and Ex versus Sp, respectively. Conditions (A.4) and 
(A.5) can be rewritten in the canonical form  
M M
Sp S > ΠΠ <   ⇔   12 /( / ) ca fbb <
> .         ( A . 4 ´ )  
M M
Sp Ex > ΠΠ <   ⇔   12 /( / ) ca h bb <
> .       ( A . 5 ´ )  
The function g is strictly increasing in  2 1 /b b  on [0,1] and represents M’s indifference curve for 
Sp and F. It is verified (numerically) that  ) / ( ) / ( 2 1 2 1 b b g b b f >  for all  2 1 /b b > 0, as claimed in 
the condition of the proposition. Furthermore, since f and g are increasing and intersect h at 
exactly one point (specifically, at  3 / 1  and atζ , respectively) we can write the following: 
  3 / 1 / ) / ( ) / ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 >
< ⇔ >
< b b b b h b b f ;     (A.6) 
( ) 2 / 3 1 ˆ / ) / ( ) / ( 2 1 2 1 2 1 − ≡ >
< ⇔ >
< h b b b b h b b g ζ .   (A.7) 
Note that  ζ < 3 / 1 . To show (i), let  ∈ 2 1 /b b [0,1/3) then (A.2) implies Ex is dominated by S  and 







F Π > Π > Π , yielding F as the equilibrium. If  ) / ( / ) / ( 2 1 2 1 b b f a c b b g < < , then 






Sp Π Π > Π , , yielding Sp as the equilibrium. Finally if 






S Π > Π > Π , . To show (ii), let  ∈ 2 1 /b b ) (1/3,ζ . 
(A.2) implies S is dominated by Ex. Conditions (A.3) (A.5´) and (A.6) imply the ordering 
required for the equilibrium description in the proposition. To show (iii), let  ∈ 2 1 /b b ] 1 , (ζ . (A.2) 
implies S is dominated by Ex and conditions (A.3), (A.6) and (A.7) imply that Ex dominates Sp. 
Therefore, F and Ex are the only outcomes possible in equilibrium. Finally, (A.1) implies the 
ordering required for the equilibrium description in the proposition.     Q.E.D. 
 
PROPOSITION A.2  Let g and h be the functions determined in Proposition 1, 
435
3 0.64 ζ
− ≡≈, and  ) / , / ( 2 1 a c b b be in Θ . Then the equilibria of the A-Dominant game is 
described as follows. 25 
(i)  If  ζ < < 2 1 / 0 b b  then the unique equilibrium outcome is 
F    if and only if   ) / ( / 0 2 1 b b k a c < < ; 
Sp   if and only if   ) / ( / ) / ( 2 1 2 1 b b g a c b b k < < . 
 (ii)   If  1 / 2 1 < < b b ζ  then the unique equilibrium outcome is 
F    if and only if   ) / ( / 0 2 1 b b k a c < < ; 
Sp   if and only if   ) / ( / ) / ( 2 1 2 1 b b h a c b b k < < ; 
Ex  if and only if   ) ( / } / ( ), / ( max{ 2 1 2 1 ζ g a c b b k b b h < < . 
 
Proof of Proposition A.2 
As argued in the text, A can only implement M’s second-best outcome (F being the first), which 
is either Sp or Ex. From (A.5’) in the proof of Proposition A.1, we already know that M’s 
second-best is Sp for  ) / , / ( 2 1 a c b b  below h and Ex above. (i.e., Sp and Ex are the corresponding 
equilibrium of the subgame starting in period 1.) A, in period 0, will not abandon product 2 if (5) 
holds. Further, note that k, as defined in (5) satisfies the following. For any  ) 1 , 0 ( / 2 1 ∈ b b , 
  ) / ( ) / ( 2 1 2 1 b b g b b k < ,   a n d         ( A . 8 )  
  ) / ( ) / ( 2 1 2 1 b b h b b k >
< ,   for  η >
<
2 1 /b b ,     (A.9) 
where  99 . 0 ≈ η . To verify (A.8), observe that both k and g are both continuous and increasing 
and then it can be shown that  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( g k <  and  ) ( ) ( x g x k =  has no solution in (0,1). The 
condition (A.9) can be verified by first noting that both k and h are continuous with k strictly 
increasing and h strictly decreasing on (0,1). This implies that they cross at most once, which 
occurs at η . The inequalities in (A.9) then follow from the fact that  3 2 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( − = < = h k . It 
follows from these two conditions that for any  ) 1 , 0 ( / 2 1 ∈ b b , F is the equilibrium if 
) / ( / 2 1 b b k a c < .  
 
Let  η , 0 ( / 2 1 ∈ b b ) and  )) / ( ), / ( min{ ), / ( ( / 2 1 2 1 2 1 b b h b b g b b k a c ∈ , retailer A implements Sp when 
abandoning product 2. Because Sp is more profitable than F for retailer A, it is the equilibrium 
outcome. Finally, let  η ζ , ( / 2 1 ∈ b b ) and  )) ( )}, / ( ), / ( (max{ / 2 1 2 1 ζ g b b k b b h a c ∈ . Then retailer A 








1 ) / ( /
b b
b b
b b l a c
+
− ≡ > .  
Observe that  0 ) / ( ' 2 1 < b b l  for all  2 1 /b b  and that 
52 1
4 ( ) 0.04174 (1) lh ζ
− ≈< = . Thus,  
12 12 (/) () ( 1 ) (/) lb b l h hb b ζ <<<  
for all  12 /( , 1 ] bb ζ ∈ , where the last inequality follows from the fact that h is decreasing. Hence, 
Ex is the equilibrium outcome in the region  η ζ , ( / 2 1 ∈ b b ) and 
)) ( )}, / ( ), / ( (max{ / 2 1 2 1 ζ g b b k b b h a c ∈ .        Q . E . D .  
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
This follows directly from Propositions A.1 and A.2. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
First consider the M-Dominant game. Clearly, 
M M
SpA SpB Π >Π  for 
A B cc < , where profit expressions 
can be directly deduced from Lemma A.1. Also, the fact that 
A cc <  implies that SpA dominates 
F, Ex, and S for parameter constellations  12 (/,/) Sp bbca ∈Θ . Hence, SpA is optimal for M and 
therefore is the equilibrium outcome for the M-Dominant game. 
In the A-Dominant game, if retailer A abandons product 2 in Stage 0, then 12 (/, /)
B bbc a ∈  Sp Θ  
and Proposition 2 imply that M’s optimal strategy is to distribute both products through retailer 
B. That is, SpB is the equilibrium of the subgame starting in Stage 1 given that retailer A does not 
carry product 2. Finally, SpB is the equilibrium of the overall game if and only if 
AA
SpA SpB Π< Π. A 
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First note that it can be directly verified that p is strictly increasing in  /
A ca . Therefore,  
12 (/ ) [ ( /) ]
A p ca p g b b >  since  12 /( / )
A cag b b > by the assumption  12 (/, /)
A
Sp bbc a ∈Θ . Finally, 
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           Q . E . D .  
 
Proof of Proposition 4 









































































b + ≡ σ . The right-hand side of (A.11) is increasing and greater than 
1 2 2
) 1 2 ( 2
−
−  for all 
2 1 /b b . Since 
1 2 2
) 1 2 ( 2
−
− ) ( 1 2
3 ζ g = − > , it follows that  Sp F CS CS >  everywhere in Θ . 
 
Comparing consumer surplus in Sp and in Ex, we have the general condition 





CS CS Ex Sp / ˆ
) / 1 ( 1









< ⇔ > .    (A.12) 
Observe that m ˆ  is decreasing and  ˆ(/) 1 mc a =  ⇒ 
17 3 22
13 /( ) ca g ζ
− => . Therefore, 
12 (/,/) bbca ∈Θ ⇒ /( ) ca g ζ <  ⇒ 12 ˆ(/) 1 / mc a b b ≥> . Hence, (A.12) holds everywhere in Θ .  
           Q . E . D .  
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